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September 22, 2008

There will be a price to pay for credit crunch bail out

It is hard to judge whether the massive rises on the financial markets on Friday (not so far continued this morning) were driven by anything other than a naive sense of relief. The huge, unprecedented lifeline thrown to the rapidly sinking banking sector by the US government possibly made many in the markets believe that the worst is over. In truth, for them, the worst may be yet to come.
There will be a huge price to pay for the massive support from public funds that has been made available to the financial services sector around the world ever since the Labour government in the UK took Northern Rock under its wing. These massive subsides will screw up public finances for years, leading to cuts in public expenditure and increases in taxation, most likely a combination of both. Electorates will simply not stand for that unless they feel the incompetence, greed and sheer lunacy of the financial markets have been purged and brought under control. That means regulation on a scale that hasn't been contemplated before. It is isn't about transparency - what is the point of being transparent about hedge fund and derivative products so complex that only a handful of people understand them, and certainly not very many of the people selling them?
It will be a different sort of regulation. It may even see the abandonment of the regulation by solvency and a move towards the strict regulation of products. This should be looked at as the financial services sector has an appalling record when it comes to creating the right products for the right people in the right circumstances. On the retail side in the UK we have pretty much had 20 years of product-related scandals and now, across the globe, the wholesale markets have proved themselves catastrophically inept too.
May be this morning's cautious opening on the European markets is a the start of the realisation that the world has changed forever and that the immediate future will not be very rosy for those who plunged us all into this crisis.

September 17, 2008

AIG: Dead Man in Chains?

Up until late last night it looked as if AIG was a dead man walking. Then the US government stepped in and effectively nationalised it, the second time in a fortnight that the right wing Bush administration has played the public ownership card, following the bale out of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It is a measure of the chaos in financial markets that both moves have been greeted with big upswings on the world's stock markets.
It used to be part of the mantra of the left of the Labour Party when socialism was still alive that it would nationalise the "commanding heights of the economy", including banks and insurance companies. Now that is a reality in the country that always liked to paint itself as the home of free markets and unfettered capitalism.
But, as we know all too well, state ownership of commercial businesses does not work. I am sure the US government knows that too which is why it is totally mistaken to paint this move as the saving of AIG. It is far from it. It will be dismembered and parts sold off as quickly as is decent and practical. It is also hard to see how its revenues, certainly from insurance business, will stand up. How can any broker recommend placing business with an insurer that would be bust if it wasn't for a huge state subsidy? Surely, its new premium income will nosedive? At best, AIG is living on a life support machine that, one day, will be turned off. At worst, it is a dead man in chains.
There is, however, something rather fitting about governments having to dig deep into public funds to prop up the financial services sector – we mustn't forget that the UK government nationalised Northern Rock last year too. For the best part of 20 years, governments around the world have allowed themselves to be mesmerised by to so-called Masters of the Universe that run (ran) the major financial institutions and passed far too much responsibility for the running of financial markets to them. Now they are having to pick up the tab for that reckless abdication of political responsibility as the one time masters are revealed as the Muppets of the Universe.

July 15, 2008

Bankers should take blame for credit crunch

I have often wondered at the informal hierarchy of the City and its financial institutions which always seems to put bankers at the top of the tree. Do they deserve to be there? The case for such pre-eminence looks very shaky to me.
It seems that the live on the edge of the fool’s paradise of power without responsibility. Is that abit harsh? Just look at the current economic crisis gripping the developed world and ask yourself where does the responsibility really lie?
Bankers have been at the forefront of persuading governments to adopt a light touch in regulating them and to hand over to(central) banks control over a lot of the central levels of economic policy. Have they used that freedom and control well? The answer has to be a resounding no. Irresponsible lending, the growth of financial instruments that are little more than gambling and a dreadful track record in running their own businesses – the charge sheet is very long and very serious.
Will they be punished? Far from it. At the slightest hint of real trouble the banks have looked for state handouts and have largely been given them for the simple reason governments know they cannot afford a collapse in the banking system. Just look what happened in the UK when a relatively modest bank, Northern Rock, got into trouble and the government hesitated before stepping in.
Bankers know that they are immune from the consequences of their decisions which is why they constantly make such bad decisions. It is a pity that they don’t display a little more humility and awareness of their responsibility for the pain other business and ordinary people are now experiencing.

January 4, 2008

Looking to the next banking crisis before solving the last one

The first tentative steps in the government's long trek to recover its credibility were announced this morning when the Chancellor, the beleaguered Alistair Darling, announced plans about plans for tackling the next banking crisis. The trouble is they haven't solved the last one yet.
Northern Rock still looks like one huge financial black hole with billions of public money being poured into it but no plan in place to recover it. The attempts to engineer a private sector sale seem to be running into the sand because of opposition from shareholders. It still looks to me as if the only sensible option is to nationalise it, strip it down to its components and then sell off those that are viable, using the proceeds to repay the huge sums that have been required to prop up this lame duck.
Why the reluctance to do this? Shareholder power seems the common excuse. But are these the most important people? I would argue no. First and foremost are the savers whose money is with the bank and these, at least, now look safe. Then, there is a careful juggling act between the needs to look after the staff and repay the loans. Only after that should shareholders get a look in.
Is this harsh? Investing in the stockmarket is a risky investment with potentially high rewards - but investors have no right to expect all the upside and then be sheltered from the downside. Northern Rock shares were a hot buy a year ago as its "too good to be true" story seduced people, many of whom should have known better.
It will be interesting to see the detail of the government's plans when they come out next month but unless they stop pussyfooting around the problem of what to do about shareholders they won't solve the current crisis let alone create a viable plan for dealing with the next one.

November 11, 2008

Parliament missing its credit crunch chance

Parliament is in severe danger of missing the chance to reassert its authority as the advocate of the people it purports to represent as the credit crunch drags on. In the last week it has blown two golden opportunities to put itself at the forefront of holding government, regulators and financial institutions to account.
First, last Monday, the Treasury Select Committee decided to turn itself into a glorified phone-in programme when it had Alistair Darling, Mervyn King and Lord Turner (New FSA chairman) in front of it. Instead of probing deeply into some of the governmental and regulatory shortcomings - failures wouldn't be too strong a description - that led to the cliff edge rescue of the banking system, it decided to put questions emailed in by the public to the three people who could shed most light on what has gone wrong. Predictably, these questions ranged from the pathetically obvious to the inanely trite and did nothing to disturb the three well prepared men. It was a huge missed opportunity and shows how poorly advised and resourced the select committees are.
Then, yesterday, the economic crisis was debated on the floor of the House of Commons at length for the first time since Parliament returned over a month ago - that delay itself is an abdication of its duty. You may wonder why this debate hasn't been more widely reported today. This is because it was the Liberal Democrats who initiated the debate and so frightened are the government of being exposed to any scrutiny over our economic woes they - with the limp connivance of the Conservatives - fielded a reserve team to face Vince Cable, who seems to conduct the political discussion about the crisis on a different level to every body else.
So, once Mr Cable had set out a very eloquent analysis of the situtaion and some of the remedies that needed to be applied, we heard from Angela Eagle, the newly elevated Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury (with a miss-mash of responsibilities including "better regulation") who spent 20 minutes trying hard to avoid answering any of the questions put to her by Mr Cable. She was followed by the even lower profile Tory spokesman Phil Hammond, who added absolutely nothing.
I suppose the insult to Mr Cable was to be expected given the political vacuum that Westminster occupies but the failure to appreciate that he has become the most widely respected elected politician in this country when it comes to commenting on the banking crisis and articulating the concerns of many ordinary people shows just how far removed Parliament has become from the people who put it there - and it wonders why politicians continue to fall in the public's regard and fail to engage people. As Barack Obama has just emphatically shown - to engage people you have to start thinking like them and stop playing political games they don't understand and, indeed, hold in contempt.

October 22, 2008

Lloyds TSB suffers bonus backlash

‘Bonus’ has become a dirty word, certainly when mentioned in the same breath as banks and in the earshot of some Labour MPs.
Last night Lloyds TSB met around 20 Parliamentarians over dinner (arranged many months previously) to share its views on the state of financial services sectors, especially mortgages, pensions and small business banking. Inevitably, the news that chief executive Eric Daniels had on Monday reassured staff that their bonuses would be paid came up.
Lloyds TSB explained patiently that this internal announcement had been aimed at call centre, branch and back office staff on relatively low salaries who have an element of performance related pay or who have reasonable expectation of receiving some very modest bonuses based on reaching certain targets, even though they do not strictly speaking have performance related pay deals. To me the shocking fact was not that these people were going to be paid bonuses of a few hundred pounds but that the basic salaries quoted for some of the people covered by the announcement were as low as £11,000, with £15,000 apparently being a fairly typical figure.
You might have expected the more left wing Labour MPs and Labour peers with strong trade union connections to have been shocked by the base level salaries Lloyds TSB pays – but not a peep on that front. They remained angry at the thought that anyone working for a bank in the current climate might qualify for a bonus. You could sense the resigned exasperation among the Lloyds TSB management at the dinner at the realisation that this was an argument that they simply couldn’t win despite the more understanding noises made by the Tories around the table.
This argument has to be put into the context of the very low esteem in which the banks are held at the moment. Recent opinion polls have suggested that the overwhelming majority of ordinary citizens on both sides of the Atlantic lay the blame for the recent financial turmoil and our present economic woes firmly at the door of the banks. They want them punished and hackles rise from Detriot to Durham at the suggestion that any bonuses should be paid. This crude, knee-jerk reaction is understandable. To carry it through to wanting to punish low paid bank staff as far removed as my paper boy from the decisions that nearly brought the entire global banking system to it knees defies reasonable commonsense. This is not the fat cats of Wall Street trying to maintain their luxury lifestyles by paying themselves huge discretionary bonuses, as revealed over the weekend.
I am all for showing those at the top of financial institutions that gambled their fortunes and our future well-being the way to the dole queues without a penny of compensation. They should have known what they were doing and shouldn’t be surprised if they have to carry the can for corporate incompetence on an unprecedented scale. Many of their staff will have to share the pain anyway as banks struggle to cut their cost base, without denying them a few hundred pounds extra in their wage packets at Christmas. That would just be spiteful.

October 15, 2008

Wither the ratings agencies?

When the dust finally settles on the wreckage of the financial system once the current storms have subsided one area the spotlight of scrutiny and blame will fall on will be the ratings agencies.
Listening to several well informed MPs and peers talking last night it is clear that they are getting a little tetchy at hearing the very tired refrain "But the ratings agencies said they were AAA". They are entitled to feel this way.
How many times have we heard people hide behind the ratings agencies when financial institutions hit the rocks? And how many times have the ratings agencies failed to do their jobs adequately? I struggle to recall the collapse of an insurer, bank or savings fund clearly predicted by the ratings agencies. Yet, people have continued to put their faith in them, a faith that for so many has now proved cruelly misplaced suspect many politicians.
Should they be regulated? Should they be expected to contribute to the compensation of people who have lost money investing in the Icelandic banks festooned with those once comforting 'A's? Should their role be taken over totally by a regulator? These are some of the questions that MPs of all parties are asking.
The agencies need to reassess urgently what their role is going to be in the future and how they are going to perform it better because these questions - and the grave doubts about the competence and adequacy of the current system that lie behind them - will not go away.

October 10, 2008

McFall lowers the temperature

There was a useful bit of scene setting yesterday by John McFall, the combative chairman of the Treasury Select Committee as it prepares for its first foray into the violent storms gripping the financial markets.
Showing a perceptive awareness of his reputation, he said financial stability should be everyone’s number one priority, adding: “We could all have fun and games but it might only add to instability”. This dampening down of the expectation that the select committee’s sessions this autumn could be akin to a political fireworks display will be welcome news to the senior figures from the housing and mortgage markets invited to appear before Mr McFall and his fellow interrogators on Tuesday.
If those giving evidence on behalf of the markets play it right on Tuesday they should be able to illicit more sympathy than hostility by shifting the blame to the wholesale markets and regulators for creating the conditions that led the chronic overheating of the housing market. I retain a healthy degree of scepticism, however, about the ability of the Treasury Select Committee to refrain from going for the jugular when it gets senior bankers and regulators in front of it later in the month.

October 8, 2008

AIG: Alive but still in chains

The cataclysm sweeping across global financial markets is moving so fast that no-one can keep up. That includes readers of this blog.
I was chided last night for my comment of a few weeks ago that AIG was a dead man in chains. A few weeks ago that is what is honestly looked like. The nationalisation of AIG by the US government looked to be just a way of postponing the inevitable demise, of managing its departure from the scene. Who, it did not seem unreasonable to ask, would want to be insured by AIG? State owned insurers simply had no place in the financial firmament.
Now state owned financial institutions are almost commonplace. We have woken up this morning in the UK to the news that many of our banks are going to join Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley on the list of banks wholly or partially owned by the taxpayer, a solution that seems not to have ended the panic on the markets – perhaps we should close the markets down for a few days and throw a bucket of cold water over the lot of them.
Anyway, where does that now leave AIG? I still think it is in chains - just look at the exchanges over its jolly for top salespeople in Congress yesterday if you think it can just carrying on as before. But it is alive and will be kept alive simply because the alternatives are unthinkable.

October 7, 2008

Treasury Committee will be akin to blood sports

The financial chaos around the world is obviously going to dominate the first few weeks of the new Parliamentary session. I noticed a few commentators wondering why Parliament wasn’t recalled early – maybe yesterday’s response to the Chancellor’s statement provides sufficient answer.
The markets are so very jittery – nervous wrecks might be a more apt description – that any word out of place by the wrong person and calamity follows almost immediately in its wake. In the case of Alistair Darling’s statement yesterday it seemed to be more about which words didn’t find a place in his statement, rather than any that did. The markets wanted to hear that the government had found a magic wand, one wave of which would solve all their problems. In practical terms they were probably looking for a huge injection of capital with as few strings as possible attached. They really were in fairyland.
It looks ever more likely that there will be a further offer of public funds to shore up British banks but it will have tough conditions attached to it. These may come in the form of high dividend expectations, profit shares that guarantee and eventual benefit to the public purse and tough restrictions on the levels of pay for executives and traders. It is simply impossible to imagine anything less getting through Parliament. After all, the political centre of gravity of our Parliament is several paces to the left of that of the US Congress and they extracted a heavy price for backing the $700bn bail out package
Another parallel with the US that we can expect to experience here is a severe grilling of anyone with any taint of guilt when it comes to causing the crisis by any Parliamentary committee that can get its hands on them. Yesterday’s grilling by House of Representatives oversight committee of ex-Lehman boss Richard Fuld gives a very appetising taste of what is to come on both sides of the Atlantic: it certainly won’t be for the squeamish.
I relish the prospect of John McFall’s Treasury Select Committee sinking its teeth deep into assorted regulators, bankers and traders during the autumn; it will be real political blood sport. Given the recent record of that committee, it should also be quite revealing and give us some idea whether any of them have a clue as to what they have unleashed, let alone ideas for controlling it.

February 12, 2009

Banks: it is all about control

When the government first stepped in to re-capitalise the banks as the financial system teetered on the brink of disaster in the autumn, I highlighted the failure to assert political control of the banks. Nothing was done, or seems to be contemplated, to back the huge public ownership of the banks with public control. This failure to connect ownership and control has come back to haunt the government in the row over the payment of bonuses.
The Prime Minister has looked weak and ineffectual in his increasingly pathetic pleas to the banks to abandon bonuses. The public believes it owns several of the banks - it does - and it thinks that with ownership should come a degree of control. Unfortunately, the government didn't make the same connection when it threw billions of pounds of taxpayers' money at the crisis-ridden sector and shows no sign of grasping the credibility gap that yawns ever wider as public anger over bonuses grows.
The banks that are now dependent on public money for survival should be answerable to Parliament. I stick to my view that the best mechanism for this would be a new select committee chaired by Vince Cable with real powers to hold the banks to account. Alongside side this there should be government-appointed directors on the banks' boards, not former bankers tainted by the years of mis-management that led up to the near collapse of the sector but genuinely independent directors empowered to hold the professionals to account.

February 17, 2009

Credit crunch confidence crisis

There is no shock value in the current crisis-ridden climate when a consumer group says the financial services sector has a mountain to climb to restore consumer confidence. Which? - once the Consumers Association - set out this case with admirably clarity when it spoke to the All Party Parliamentary Group on Insurance & Financial Services recently. More of a shock was its critique of a regulatory system that we all know has failed but which few have yet pointed so clearly at where they believe the fundamental fault lines lie. More of that later.

Which? used a recent survey to illustrate how far consumer confidence had been rocked over the last few months. Here are a few figures from that survey:
• 84% think the banking system needs to be reformed to avoid another crisis.
• 21% do not trust banks to keep their money safe.
• 72% of pension holders are worried about the value of their pension.
• 35% of current mortgage holders are worried about having their home repossessed.
There are plenty more in the full presentationWhich APPG presentation.ppt
Consumers need to be confident that their money is safe, said Which?, as the current situation is bad for consumers and bad for the financial services industry. The whole system cannot function without trust and the focus has to be on restoring that lost trust starting with getting the banks - especially those relying on taxpayer support - to treat customers fairly. Which? was particularly critical of the failure of banks to manage the contraction of credit which it attacked as going "from feast to famine".
It also called for a stronger voice for consumers in the running of the nationalised and part-nationalised banks, starting with representation on UK Financial Investments which has been set-up by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to oversee these unwanted - at least unsought-after - state holdings.

All predictable stuff, as was the assertion that regulation needs to be stronger, more probing and much more consumer-focussed. Which?, went further than this, however, spelling out where it thought the fundamental faults with the current regime lay.

Firstly, it called for a separation of retail and investment banking, a call for a return to the days of the US Glass-Steagall Act which kept the riskier end of wholesale and investment banking away from what we used to call the clearing banks: cross-ownership was prohibited in the US which effectively put a block on it elsewhere in the world. When this Act, passed in the wake of the Great Crash of 1929, was swept away in 1999 the seeds of the current crisis were sown, argued Which?. The high risk addiction of the investment banks replaced the innate caution of the very traditional retail banking sector.

The second fault line Which? drew to the attention of MPs contains the irreconcilable conflict between prudential supervision and consumer protection. The thrust of Which's argument as it emerged in discussion with the Parliamentarians at the meeting was that if the number one priority is solvency then decisions will be made that will not be in the interest of consumers, essentially where we are today with the brutal shut-down of credit destroying the mortgage market and other lines of consumer and business credit. This would require a total reform of the regulatory regime put in place after Labour came to power in 1997 and which has the broadly based Financial Services Authority at it heart. Which? would like to see prudential regulation handed to a freshly empowered Bank of England with the FSA left to concentrate on a more consumer orientated role.

This is an interesting analysis and one that will, I am sure, emerge from elsewhere as the debate about what happened, why it happened and how the current system of regulation allowed it to happen gathers momentum. Whether it is entirely right I have some doubts. As unpalatable as it is to most in the UK financial services sector I still think that we will find ourselves looking at some form of product regulation more along mainstream European lines as the most direct and effective way of convincing consumers that regulators have really taken control of the problem. The irony of this is that we in the UK have fought hard over the last 20 years - ever since the run-up to the creation of the Single Market in 1992 - to convince the rest of Europe that prudential regulation was the way forward and that product regulation was not in the interests of consumers. It is an argument that now looks threadbare.


February 25, 2009

Europe draws up the battle lines on financial regulation

It should come as no surprise that the European Commission will launch a bid to create a pan-European financial regulator. The abject failure of national regulators to prevent, predict or plan for the successive crises that have swamped the financial services sector over the past 18 months is an open invitation to a highly interventionist organisation like the Commission to step in.
It will be an interesting battle. Gordon Brown shows few signs of admitting that the system of regulation he put in place in the early days of the Labour government was deeply flawed. I have seen reports suggesting that the Prime Minister has "relaxed" his opposition to more Europe-wide regulation but I don't see that reflected in anything he says. At the weekend, he was critical of proposals - gathering pace on both sides of the Atlantic - to restore the split between retail and investment banking. It does seem that he just cannot bring himself to admit that anything he has done or supported in the past has been wrong.
He will oppose the creation of any pan-European regulator once it becomes clear that it wants to approach regulation in a different way to that he put in place in the UK. This will leave the UK very isolated as the rest of Europe sees our system as being the most deeply flawed which is why we have the most serious problems.

February 26, 2009

Does the FSA really have the answers?

Macho posturing. Empty macho posturing. That could be the overwhelming feeling one is left with in the wake of the Financial Services Authority's appearance before the Treasury Select Committee. Certainly if you relied on the BBC's Robert Peston you would feel vindicated in that judgement. For once, the usually admirable Mr Peston has been too hasty in his condemnation of the relatively new regime being put in place at the FSA by Lord Turner and Hector Sants.
It is, of course, no more than one would expect of the FSA's bosses to own up to the mistakes of the past. After all, the wreckage of the financial system lies all around us, grim witness to the total failure of a light touch regulatory system bullishly promoted here and in the USA. Also, on the very day that the European Commission made its pitch to take over regulation you would expect the FSA to come out fighting.
A more detailed consideration of what Lord Turner said yesterday does suggest that there is much more going on behind the scenes than they are being given credit for. Whether it is enough to preserve the FSA's key position in the regulatory firmament is by no means clear but it does point the way to a fundamental shift in its approach to financial regulation and, crucially, aligns it more closely with European thinking and the consumer lobby in the UK.
The commitment to embrace product regulation is a rejection of the last 25 years of financial regulation in this country. Ever since the unfettered free market regime of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and the battle with the European Union in the run-up to the creation of the single market in 1992, product regulation has been dismissed in this country as the great inhibitor of dynamism and growth in financial services. We won that battle in Europe and Solvency II is one of the products of that regime where all the emphasis is on capital adequacy and balance sheets, ignoring the products. The European Commission wants Solvency II fully implemented by May. Why? So that it can clear the decks for an assault on the products of financial institutions. The FSA is foreshadowing this.
Don't run away with the idea that the FSA is just looking at the high risk financial instruments of the investment banks when it talks about product regulation. The example it offered yesterday was mortgages where Lord Turner suggested that capping loan-to-value at 80% or 85% might be something the FSA should do.
The other clue as to the FSA's thinking was the promise to increase "by several times" the amount of capital that banks must hold to cover the riskier end of their trading books. This seems to be a way of separating retail and investment banking by stealth. The FSA seems to saying that if it can't move quickly - because the Prime Minister doesn't accept the case - to separate retail and investment banking, then it will do it by imposing tough capital rules that will make it attractive for some institutions to back away from investment banking. This is probably the route that Royal Bank of Scotland will go down later today.

March 6, 2009

Brown has lost the regulatory reform battle already - he just can't bring himself to admit it

As hard as he might try, it looks as if Gordon Brown has already lost control of the debate on the future regulation of the world's financial services industries. His pleas to President Obama and the US Congress for a co-ordinated global response sounded very fine but lacked substance and, crucially, lacked credibility. His hopes of pulling off a deal at the G20 Summit next month now look very slim.

Most of the rest of the world is not looking to the UK or the United States for a lead in reforming the way financial markets and the firms that play in them are regulated for the simple reason that they think the Anglo-US approach of the last 25 years has a lot to do with the mess the world's economies are currently in as many leading commentators are starting to point out. Europe, in particular, does not want a UK or US solution and is already busily working at its own. Last week's Larosiere report spells out a new approach that has quickly won approval in the European Commission and among key national governments in mainland Europe. The Larosiere Report?  You haven't heard of it? You can be forgiven because the coverage in the UK of this key report for the European Commission by former International Monetary Fund managing director Jacques de Larosiere has been poorly covered here. Yet, it has set the EU on a course to create three new pan-national regulatory bodies - the European Banking Authority, the European Securities Authority and the European Insurance Authority.

These new regulators will be given wide powers to impose supervisory standards on national regulators, make binding decisions on technical issues (very likely to include powers over product design) and enforce adequate prudential supervision in conjunction with another new body, the European Systemic Risk Council. Certain pan-European organisations will find themselves closely regulated for the first time with credit ratings agencies at the top of the list - they are in for a very nasty shock if these recommendations go through. For the time-being, the EU envisages micro-level regulation of individual firms being left with national regulators but it sets out a course towards far greater control in the future, threatening to bring a range of other market and conduct of business issues under the remit of its new structure.

The report and the Commission make a nod in the direction of the world outside Europe's borders by urging a "deepening of the EU's bilateral financial relations with all its major partners" but here, in the very next line, is the key statement of intent "There is an opportunity for the EU to seize global leadership". This is where the battle lines will be drawn and it is hard to see Gordon Brown's voice being heard above the noise of that battle.

There are some scores to be settled with the UK among many regulators in Europe dating back to the creation of the Single Market in financial services in 1992 when the UK won a protracted argument over the balance between prudential regulation and product regulation, with the EU rules coming down firmly in favour of the former. At the time, many financial products in Germany, France, Italy and Spain were tightly regulated in terms of design and rates. All of that was replaced by a more UK orientated system of prudential supervision and it is that system that many in Europe believe has now failed, no more so that in the UK. Larosiere comes back time and again in his report to the need to regulate at much more detailed level, especially when it comes to hedge funds, over-the -counter derivatives and credit default swaps. It also has things to say on the need for greater risk retention by the issuers of securitised products and calls for common rules for what it rather vaguely refers to as "investment funds".

The UK has given a lukewarm welcome to the Larosiere report but merely praising it as a "good basis for further discussions" as Alistair Darling did this week is hardly going to win friends at the European Commission, especially as he goes on to dismiss the idea of given any new pan-European bodies powers over national regulators. Europe sees it as the agenda for those discussions and we can expect to see France and Germany pressing this at the G20 summit. They are not interested in the sort of wishy-washy talk of global co-operation that the Prime Minister peddled to the US Congress this week: they want firm action with tough new rules and see how to deliver that as the starting point for debate, not merely as an option for discussion.

If the UK financial services sector wants to engage in the real debate over the future of regulation it will be much better advised to look to Brussels rather than to Westminster.


March 18, 2009

Goodwin's pension is obscuring the issue

There is no coherent argument that can be offered for defending Sir Fred Goodwin's pension and it was disappointing to see yesterday's hearings of the Treasury Select Committee largely wasted in pursuing the City minister Lord (Paul) Myners over the Goodwin pension.
We all know what happened. In the eye of the crisis last October when the banking system was being swept towards an abyss, a morally bankrupt RBS board pulled a fast one when they knew the government wouldn't be looking. They thought Goodwin was been sacrificed to satisfy the government as it poured public money into their ailing company and so did everything they could to feather his nest. The decisions they made were deliberate, calculating and cynical. You cannot blame the government - in particular Lord Myners - for not noticing this at the time. Can you imagine the outrage if government ministers had become so distracted by arguing with the RBS board over Goodwin's pension that RBS or another bank had gone under. Re-arranging deckchairs on the Titanic would have been an under-statement of how that would have looked.
The real anger shouldn't be aimed at the government but at a board who acted so cynically, sadly showing what Barclays has just proved yet again with its gagging of The Guardian - that bankers simply do not understand how they are perceived by the rest of us. What is needed to steer us out of this crisis is a real partnership between government, regulators (here and elsewhere but especially the European Union) and financial institutions. Clearly, too many of the latter are still not working to the same agenda as everyone else. That is the real issue now.

March 24, 2009

Noose tightens on ratings agencies

The threat of tough rules to bring the ratings agencies into a new pan-European regulatory framework took a step closer to reality last night as the European Parliament's economic and monetary affairs committee voted through a hard-hitting package of proposals.
The prospect of ratings agencies being subject to regulatory scrutiny was flagged up by the Larosiere report and has also been on the agenda of the UK's Treasury Select Committee enquiry into the banking crisis. Up to now, however, the proposals have been abit vague and have pointed to much of the detailed regulation being left to national regulators. The proposals put forward by the internal market commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, put the Euroepan Union firmly in the driving seat of that reform. Under the proposals which now go to the European Parliament next month, all ratings agencies will have register with the Committee of European Securities Regulators - itself earmarked for a greater role by Larosiere - or be subject to equivalent regulation if based outside the EU. Within the detail of the proposals is a requirement that all lead analysts should be rotated every five years.
This is yet another example of the EU pushing ahead in its determination to take control of the reform agenda.

March 25, 2009

What can Brown salvage from the G20 Summit?

I am still struggling to see where this consensus the Prime Minister keeps talking about over fiscal stimuli and international agreement on future regulation is going to come from. His current mini-world tour in the run up to next week's London Summit doesn't seem to be getting him anywhere very fast. It is almost as if he is saying the same thing over and over again in an attempt to convince himself that everyone agrees with him but he is actually beginning to look very isolated.
The only clear consensus I can see among the UK, the US and the European Union is over the push for greater transparency on the part of tax havens and can easily imagine this being trumpeted as a major triumph in order to cover up the divisions elsewhere.
On regulation, it looks as if there is very little meeting of minds and, as I have said before in this blog, Europe is making the running here, although there is now some very tough talk emerging from the US too. So far, the UK hasn't put any specific proposals on the table so it is hard to see exactly where the expectations are being set for the summit.
When it comes to pumping even more public money into beleaguered economies, this message has gone down well enough in New York where the new administration has embraced this route with vigour but it is being met with a frosty reception on this side Atlantic. The main EU countries are not struck on this approach, although both France and Germany have indulged in some targeted public support, especially in the automotive sector.
It is at home where the support for this approach is collapsing. Yesterday, the Governor of the Bank of England made it clear that the central bank does not believe further extension of the public debt is sensible and, right on cue, the markets gave it a thumbs down today when they failed to fully support the gilt auction the the first time in seven years, an ominous sign that even if the government wanted to do more it simply won't be able to.
It is getting very hard to see where Gordon Brown is going to be able to take the G20 Summit.

April 1, 2009

Myners isn't the Goodwin fall guy

The Tories seem intent on pursuing Lord Myners, the City minister, out of office over what he did or didn't know about Sir Fred Goodwin's pension arrangements. They are wrong and do themselves no credit.
As I have said before, it is a really tough call to expect government ministers over that cataclysmic weekend of 12-13 October to have set aside time to scrutinise the details of the severance package offered to Goodwin. Had they done so and spotted that the RBS board was pulling a fast one by enhancing his severance package (I'll return to that point later) but allowed the crisis gripping the banking system to spread even further we would have had genuine cause for complaint.
If I was Lord Myners I would now be wondering what some of my Treasury officials were up not to flag up some serious concerns over the Goodwin deal and perhaps I might have wondered at the time why it was being dressed up as early retirement for someone only in his early 50s. The fact that he was alerted to the possible size of the pensions pot is not really that important as there would have been so many multi-million and multi-billion pound numbers being thrown around that weekend you can understand why this one didn't make an impression. It would be nice to think that Lord Myners would have had a moment to pause to reflect on the RBS board's proposal and say to them that it should wait a couple of days as it needed further thought but we do not live in an ideal world.
I think the Tories have been duped by the RBS and Sir Tom McKillop's letter yesterday into thinking that they now have an easy target in Lord Myners. The real target remains the RBS board and its remuneration committee. It is at the very least disingenuous to claim that there was no enhancement to the deal offered to Goodwin. They didn't have to offer him early retirement: indeed, there is no real reason why it should have been viewed as any sort of retirement. Goodwin's incompetence at the helm of RBS had steered it to disaster. Most chief executives in that situation get offered a paid up contract, possibly with a little boost to their pension fund alongside and often this appears too generous a reward for failure. That should have been the starting point for getting rid of Goodwin and why it wasn't should be the question politicians should pursue.
We have a culture of rewarding senior executives for failure in this country and we need to challenge that if we are to re-build industry and the financial services sector out of the havoc of the current economic storms. Sadly, it seems that the Tories, who now view themselves increasingly as a government-in-waiting, have no appetite for doing that.

April 2, 2009

ABI pitch for London-based regulator is a canny move as G20 meets

Well, they have arrived at Excel and within a few hours we will find out was has been agreed and what has not been agreed. It will no doubt take a forensic scrutiny of every word in the statements published by the G20 leaders to work out what has really happened. It will also trigger months of debate and negotiation over the detail of how to deliver what was agreed.
In this context, the comments the other day by Stephen Haddrill, the director general of the Association of British Insurers, making a pitch for any new pan-European regulator to be based in London seem rather shrewd. I am sure he has sensed the direction the debate about future regulation is taking accurately as we do seem to be heading towards an European regulator in the wake of the Larosiere Report and the strength of the Franco-German alliance on the need for tougher regulation yesterday gave further impetus to that move.
So, Mr Haddrill's approach of acknowledging the inevitability of a European regulator but then making a case for it to be based in London seems quite smart. What he is saying is that by basing in London we could ensure that it absorbs more of the UK approach of prudential regulation and avoids a lurch back to the pre-1992 system of product-based regulation  that was widespread on the continent and which has its strong supporters in Brussells, Paris and Berlin.
It is an interesting contribution to the debate.

April 3, 2009

G20 points to a new era of regulation - but by whom?

There will be hundreds of thousands of words written over the next few days analysing the outcome of yesterday's G20 Summit in London and I will be looking hard for an answer to this question: who is in charge of the new, tougher, regulation that has been promised?
The communique from the summit says that the Financial Stability Forum will be revamped into a Financial Stability Board and given new powers to oversee  (note, not regulate) banks and international markets. However, it also says that the International Monetary Fund should take a stronger role in supervising the world financial system. Are the seeds of conflict being sown here?
The communique from the summit certainly sets out a tough sounding manifesto for regulation and supervision but is too quiet on how that should be delivered. This probably leaves the door wide open for the European Union, with the strong backing of France and Germany, to pursue the agenda it has already set out in the Larosiere Report. This could create further conflict with the newly emboldened FSB and IMF.
Of course, another key point of interest to many of us will be how this will play out in the battlefield of domestic politics. Gordon Brown has won alot of praise for getting a consensus on so many points out of the summit, although he did fail on the major fiscal stimulus he was hoping for. This throws the focus back onto the Budget later this month. Without the extra help he was hoping for from the rest of the world and UK government spending already seriously over-committed, he has limited room for manoeuvre with time running out. The potential medium to long term benefits of the summit deal will not be enough to revive Labour's political fortunes. They need something that is going to make a major impact in the next 12 months if the Prime Minister's success on the international stage is to help him towards electoral success next year.

April 9, 2009

Is breaking up the RBS and Lloyds a good idea?

I am totally unconvinced by the new Conservative policy of breaking up the partially state-owned banks as their ownership is returned to the private sector. Shadow Chancellor George Osborne's speech advocating this earlier this week was full of glib phrases - "too big to fail but potentially too big to bail" - but desperately short on substance and an understanding of the consequences of pursing such a policy.
We need a banking sector that is fit for the modern world, one that will be increasingly global despite the current retrenchment by some multi-national corporations. I say "we" and I really mean Britain here. If British banks are too small to serve the needs of global corporations then they simply won't get the business and huge amounts of capital will flow out of the City of London and the UK economy. That will cause untold economic damage.
Mr Osborne also failed to say what he would do with the banks that remain wholly in private hands. Is he expecting the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England to break them up? If they aren't broken up, how will he stop Barclays, HSBC, Santander and others outside the UK regulatory net buying up the nicely parceled-up mini-banks he will create with his privatisation programme?
Where he could have a point that would have been worth making - because the government is very quiet on this - is how do you return such huge state holdings to the private sector without de-stabilising the stock market and the banking sector? Timing will be one part of the answer but selling stakes off in digestible chunks will very likely be another. This lack of an properly thought out exit strategy is one area where the opposition should be scoring a few hits on the government.

April 20, 2009

Treasury Committee picks off its targets one-by-one

The Treasury Select Committee looks to be pursuing an interesting strategy when it comes to reporting on its in-depth inquiry into the causes of the banking crisis.
Usually Select Committees publish single reports at the end of such inquiries with recommendations for legislative action if appropriate. What the Treasury Select Committee is doing is publishing a series of reports focussing on specific issues. The first of these came out earlier this month and called for compensation for charities that lost money when the Icelandic banks collapsed but dismissed calls for local authorities to be similarly compensated. Why this piecemeal approach?
There seem to be two obvious answers to that question. The first is that the committee disagrees over some of the fundamental issues thrown up by the inquiry and has no hope of reaching an consensus on an all embracing overall report. The alternative explanation is that the members feel they will make more impact if they pick off the key areas of concern one-by-one. It seems this latter explanation is the more likely.
The tone of the committee's many public hearings on the banking crisis did not suggest that there were too many areas of fundamental party political disagreement over the key issues, certainly not enough to derail a report, although the huge challenge of getting agreement over all the topics that a wide-ranging report would cover shouldn't be under-estimated.I think the members have taken the view that they can make more impact and move faster by homing in on issues where they believe they can make a difference to the public and political debates.
I shall be looking out especially for the committee's response to the proposal that regulators should be able to impose restrictions on the press at times of financial crisis. I submitted a hard-hitting response to this proposal in behalf of Incisive Media which can be found on p141 of the published evidence: this should be read in conjunction with the evidence from the Periodical Publishers' Association which is on p178 as they were written to complement each other.

April 27, 2009

Trade credit row could turn nasty for insurers

The trouble with the sort of help the government announced in the Budget to help ease the pressures in the domestic trade credit market is that it suddenly alters people's expectations. With many businesses, especially in the retail sector, going under in the first few months of this year, stories about the problems some firms have faced in getting adequate had a "so what do you expect?" feel about them. Now, the tone has changed.
People are looking at the £5bn top-up scheme announced by Alistair Darling and thinking that this sort of subsidy should be making the problems go away. At the very least, they will say, it should be helping soften the tough stance trade credit insurers have been taking. When this doesn't happen, things can turn nasty.
The Association of British Insurers was long on fine words in the run-up to the Budget; now people will expect action to deliver the promises it suggests in its code of practice but, as we know, it has no powers, beyond persuasion, over its members. It will take a concerted effort on the part of the ABI to make sure that political and public opinion doesn't turn against the insurance industry on this issue. So far, the insurance market has managed to avoid attracting the opprobrium directed at the banking sector. Now it has been offered a public subsidy there is a danger that many people will see it as fair game.

April 29, 2009

All Party Group tackles trade credit insurance

The All Party Parliamentary Group on Insurance & Financial Services will be looking into the issues in the UK trade credit insurance market on Tuesday 19 May (11.30am, Committee Room 17, House of Commons) when the Association of British Insurers and the British Retail Consortium will be presenting their views.
This should be an interesting session as the government's intervention in this market will change the dynamics and will also alter the tone of the public debate about the impact of the higher claims volumes caused by the recession.

May 5, 2009

Banks could face a mutual future

The second installment of the Treasury Select Committee's report into the banking crisis is a 120 page blockbuster. Predictably, it doesn't pull many punches when it comes to apportioning blame and roundly condemns the banks and their managements for what it sees as their reckless behavior. However, it offers alot more than the now almost obligatory public flogging of the bankers.
It is a well structured dissection of the events, especially the many government interventions, as the crisis unfolded and engulfed the UK banks. Inevitably, it is slightly selective in places, largely determined by the impact that different witnesses had on the committee, but the banks - their present and former managements - are given a fair hearing in this report.
Like many Select Committee reports, it is longer on criticisms of what should and shouldn't have been done than it is on detailed solutions of its own but there is enough of the latter to suggest where it might drive the debate in future.
Among its key observations is the lack of clear strategic objectives from the government for the state owned and controlled banks. The committee points to several weaknesses that have already been exposed by this absence of strategic vision, such as the conflict between demanding greater lending but then asking for a 12% coupon on the preference shares it issued, but it only gets halfway to creating a vision of its own. Let me help them along by joining up some of the dots in their own report.
The committee is supportive of looking further at the Governor of the Bank of England's suggestion that in future there should be some separation of investment banking and retail banking. He stopped short of recommending a wholesale return to the rigidity of the US Glass Steagall Act [Following the Great Crash of 1929, the US Congress passed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act which, among other measures, prohibited a bank holding company (a retail bank) from owning other financial institutions (such as investment banks).This provision was repealed in 1999.] The committee seems rather more enthusiastic about the idea and commends it for further consideration but doesn't say how such an objective might be achieved.
The report then goes on to bemoan the absence of an exit strategy from the state ownership and while it seems lukewarm about the prospect of deploying 1980s style privatisation to achieve this it doesn't put forward any firm proposals of its own. This could well be down to political differences in the all party committee which couldn't be resolved in time for publication of the report and may, indeed, be irreconcilable. However, further into the report two further recommendations could, if you join them all up, provide the answer to both the desire for separation of retail and investment banking and the need for a coherent exit strategy. 
The first of these is support for a rekindling of mutuality which the committee says should be encouraged through start-ups and remutualisations. The second is the suggestion that rather than blockbuster privatisations the return of the banks to the private sector could be done by selling them off in tranches. This makes sense otherwise you could end up creating some huge financial institutions that dominate the market and distort competition. Combine these two ideas and you have a creative solution to the problem: for the retail banking side of the nationalised banks create a series of mutuals (protected from takeover for a certain period so they have a chance to establish themselves) while for the wholesale operations look for sales by tender or privatistation to other investment banks. This would have to be underpinned by a new regulatory requirement to create some distance, if not total separation, between retail and wholesale banking. This could probably be done initially through a clever use of the promised new capital requirements and risk profiling. It would be dangerous for the UK to go unilaterally down the road to a new Glass-Steagall regime, although there is alot of support for the idea elsewhere in Europe and it even has its proponents in the United States. Using the capital requirements would be a quicker and more flexible solution that enforcing the separation by legislation, at least until we see how the rest of the world moves on this.
This report promises at least four or five further reports on other aspects of the crisis from the committee which, on the promise of the first two, will be well worth reading. I do wonder whether all the committee's fine words and, so far, sensible, if rather cautious, recommendations might not drown under the sheer volume of its own outpourings.

May 15, 2009

Should Myners have stopped Goodwin's pension?

Another day, another report from the Treasury Select Committee - and another barrage of disclosures about MPs' expenses.
This morning we have the third instalment from the Treasury Select Committee following its inquiry into the banking crisis, Banking Crisis: reforming corporate governance and pay in the City. There is a huge, inescapable, irony about MPs publishing a report on remuneration in the City at a time when many of them have been exposed as grasping fiddlers themselves. It has meant that so far the report has been given very low key coverage, except for its condemnation of City minister Lord Myners for his "naivete" over his handling of Sir Fred Goodwin's pension arrangements when he left RBS.
Having read the sections of the report dealing with Myners' role in approving the terms of Goodwin's departure, I still believe that it is harsh to heap some much of the blame for the outrageous deal onto a minister. We all need to cast our minds back to the nervous, panicky days of last October when the world's banking system looked to be hurtling out of control into total collapse. The stakes were high and ministers were meeting virtually round the clock to work out what could be done to head off the then impending disaster. Should they have been looking harder at the package that RBS remuneration committee cooked up? I didn't think so before and I am still not convinced now. Myners had bigger fish to fry that weekend.
Much of the rest of what this report says is sound common sense as it returns to the theme of having massive rewards that are out of line with the risks and which seem to have no downside. The trouble is that this is just not going to be taken very seriously in the current climate where the media focus is all on MPs expenses and where the hole they have dug for themselves seems to be getting deeper every day. It is a crisis out of control.
However, when the dust has settled, some of what the Treasury Select Committee is recommending may suddenly be viewed as having s fresh moral authority. That might be hard to contemplate in the current climate: just how could MPs find any moral authority to lecture anyone else on excessive remuneration? A fair question.
There is alot in the report's 45 recommendations that is about transparency and that is where MPs might be able to achieve some progress in their desire to reform remuneration in the City. MPs are suffering mainly because transparency has been forced on them. Now it is here it will never go away but, they may ask themselves, why should we be the only people exposed to such harsh scrutiny? Gradually, they may be able to turn the tables on other sections of society whose remuneration policies have also caused public disquiet.
As to the Treasury Select Committee's series of reports on the banking crisis, we appear to be due at least two more: one on regulation which could be the most controversial and one on the international dimension. There is also the possibility of a couple of more focussed reports on topics such as the role of hedge funds and the future of the mortgage market, although they might be wrapped up in the next two reports.

May 19, 2009

Trade credit insurers calm the political waters

It has certainly been a day of competing attractions at Westminster. The scurrying back and forth through the corridors of the Palace of Westminster and the conspiratorial knots of MPs in almost every corner suggested something was going on as I arrived there this morning. Indeed, it was. The Speaker, the hapless Michael Martin, had just announced his resignation in a month's time.

There was the debate on Equitable Life about to take place in Westminster Hall, which doesn't seem to have moved things forward but we'll have a look at the full transcript of that one in the morning. But I was there for the meeting of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Insurance & Financial Services to discuss the rumblings of discontent around the trade credit insurance market. It was an interesting line-up with the British Retail Consortium expressing the concerns from the coalface, the British Insurance Brokers' Association telling it from the broker/insurer interface and the Association of British Insurers speaking for the underwriters who end up paying the claims.

There was really very little disagreement among them and a strong consensus that the £5bn top up scheme announced by the government in the Budget would not make alot of difference. The BRC dismissed it as "too little, too late", describing the 1 April 2009 start date as being so far after the worst of the crisis was over as to be of little real value to retailers and their suppliers. The BRC would like to see it back-dated to 1 April 2008, although it is hard to see how this could work as a back-dating that far would surely only appeal to those business that knew they had bad debts that would give rise to claims that they hadn't got cover for. There might be scope for rolling it back a few months to cover potential claims that could arise, say, when the common 120 days of credit expire but even then you are coming close to insuring a certainty. You can't help feeling some sympathy for the BRC though as it is clear this scheme was needed some months back as crisis started to grip the high street.

That sympathy was only enhanced by learning from the ABI that it had first been asked by government to discuss the top-up scheme last November but was sworn to secrecy. If only the government had moved faster then and got something in place before the end of the year it might have done some real good.

There did seem to be a sense of relief all round that the government had not been tempted down the same road as the French government with its scheme for offering 100% where it had been withdrawn (as opposed to the UK scheme which is a maximum 50% top just when cover has been reduced and then only for six months): "We are not asking for a scheme that second guesses the market", said the BRC's Jane Milne, showing the sort of understanding for the insurers' position that you would expect from someone who used to work for the ABI.

The ABI took the opportunity to take a swipe at pre-pack administrations which it claimed "often leave the unsecured creditors and insurers completely exposed while the 'phoenix' company rises from the ashes and goes off with all the viable continuing business". The ABI's spokesman, its head of general insurance, Nick Startling, stopped short of calling for an end to pre-packed administrations when pressed by some of the group members but urged greater transparency and notification. I did detect some support for this criticism on the Tory side.

All-in-all it appears that the trade credit insurance market doesn't have alot to fear on the political front at the moment if this degree of calm consensus can be maintained.

June 2, 2009

Financial services regulation: House of Lords backs the global option put forward at G20

As the political chaos unleashed by the MPs' expenses scandal continues to dominate the headlines and totally absorb political leaders of all parties, there are some sharp reminders that life - real life - goes on in the world of politics. It was interesting to see in yesterday's Financial Times that business leaders have started to air concerns about just how far politicians have become distracted from the important agenda flowing from the financial and economic crises of the last year. This morning we had another reminder of just how important a debate is brewing up around financial services regulation when the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee published its report on banking supervision and regulation.
This is a big report with alot to say about regulation and banking supervision, much of it very obvious criticism of the failures of the tripartite regulatory regime and the lack of clarity in the roles of the Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England and the Treasury. I want to look at the contribution the report makes to the wider international debate about the reform of banking supervision. This is buried in paragraphs 128 to 143 of the report under the heading International Supervision.
The House of Lords argues strongly that any extension of supranational banking supervision should be on a global, not a regional basis. It does sympathise with the critique that the European Union's Larosiere Report offers of the failures of the existing mechanisms but rejects its conclusions that the answer is a series of new and strengthened European institutions, arguing instead that the solutions need to be global, not regional. In coming to this conclusion, The House of Lords is lining up firmly on the UK government's side and gives strong backing to the proposal developed by Gordon Brown at the London G20 Summit that a new Financial Stability Board should be established in partnership with an enhanced role for the International Monetary Fund.
In normal times, this would have been seized on by the Treasury as it needs to do find some allies to help it stand up to what looks, at the moment, to be an unstoppable tide in favour of a European solution in the EU. These are not normal times. We have a government paralysed by an unprecedented political crisis with a Chancellor looking increasing doomed. Picking up and reading a lengthy House of Lords' report is not likely to be one of Mr Darling's priorities this week. The pile of reading will only get bigger in the next week as the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee report covering many of the same issues is expected to be published. It is hard to see just how and when these important issues are going to get addressed in the current fevered political atmosphere.

June 22, 2009

Irresponsible bankers will smile at the global regulatory reform chaos

The last week has seen a flurry of activity around the world on the regulatory front but I have a suspicion that the only people who will be really satisfied are the very people at whom the reforms are aimed - the institutions that caused the financial storms of the last year or so. As far as I see it, the United States and Europe have such fundamentally different approaches to this that it is hard to see any global regulatory consensus emerging, let alone concerted action to put in place a regulatory system that would prevent the near collapse of the western financial system again. We have to remember that we are only looking at a slightly calmer scene now because of the billions of public money poured into propping up the system and its institutions. As Sir Martin Sorrell observed on Radio 4 last Friday, the amount of public debt racked up dealing with this is equivalent to the cost of a major war and it should be inconceivable that no-one is held account for causing that war.

Let's start in the UK.

At the annual Mansion House Dinner in the City of London last week, we saw the government and the Bank of England at loggerheads over the path regulatory reform should take. One was pleading for very limited action, saying that we should just look to the boards of the banks and other financial institutions to take a longer term, more responsible view. The other argued for some tough action to ensure that we didn't create monsters that were "too big to fail", suggesting that there could be a Glass-Steagal like split of investment and retail banking. You might have thought the Governor of the Bank of England was the one arguing for just having a quiet word in the ears of the City grandees. You would be wrong. It was a Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, talking in the wake of the worst financial and economic crisis in over 60 Years.

New Labour has always been in thrall to the City. It is one of the reasons why the credit bubble was allowed to grow so huge before bursting and why so many high risk products were allowed to corrode institutional balance sheets. Labour trusted the City, probably because it doesn't really understand it, and its whole approach to regulation has been to allow the City to get on with making money, naively it thought for the country. I have seen no clearer indication that this is a government that has run out of ideas, incapable of changing course even when its previous course took the country onto the rocks, than its failure to grasp the need for a radical overhaul of financial regulation and the failed tripartite system.

The day after this stunning public divergence between the government and the central bank in the UK, the Obama administration in the United States came out with its proposed reforms. I don't want to be too dismissive of such a complex plan but it is a mess. There seems to be a regulator for everything, a whole new tier of federal regulation to overlay the already cumbersome regulatory system that some parts of the financial sector, such as the insurance industry, have to contend with at state level. In some ways it is reminiscent of the UK's first stab at comprehensive regulation of the financial services sector with the 1988 Financial Services Act which spawned a real alphabet soup of narrow sector regulators. There is a certain sense of déjà vu in reading US commentators attacking the Obama plan on the same grounds. It will leave gaps and create opportunities for regulatory arbitragemand these will be exploited by those who don't want to be properly supervised.

In Europe, meanwhile, there seems to be a greater sense of purpose, even if couldn't look more different to the US approach if it tried.

The European Union wants to move to fewer, supranational regulators and has an ambitious plan for getting there. Despite UK doubts - opposition would probably be a more accurate description of the government's stance - this plan is edging ahead and was largely approved at the summit of EU leaders at the end of last week.

So far, despite fierce attacks on "Anglo-Saxon" attitudes to regulation and the contribution these have made to the crisis, EU leaders have been keen to keep the dissenting UK government on board and have made compromises around the chairmanship of the proposed new regulators to achieve this. To understand why they have done this you have to look at the wider political scene in Europe.

The EU needs to get the Lisbon Treaty ratified, a process that will probably take until the end of this year. The Labour government backs the treaty and has never been prepared to contemplate bowing to demands for it to be put to a referendum in the UK. The Tories oppose the treaty and have said that if it is not ratified if (or as they see it, when) they become the government, they will stop the ratification process, possibly putting the treaty to a referendum. This is a doomsday scenario as far as the rest of the EU is concerned so they are prepared to go quite a long way to making Gordon Brown's life as easy as possible to ensure he survives until the treaty is finally nailed down. While it is very hard to imagine a British government falling over a dust up in Europe on financial regulation, such is the febrile nature of British politics at the moment EU leaders are not prepared to contribute to the Prime Minister's discomfort and risk him being forced into an autumn General Election.

So, where does that leave the much vaunted desire of world leaders (as expressed at April's G20 Summit) to make sure we never have to go through the same crisis again? Frankly, it is desperately hard to tell but I still think that the most coherent and focused case for reform has been that made by the EU. The challenge they will face is translating that into a global plan.

Meanwhile, those most in need of a firm regulatory grip being placed on their collar will look at this huge divergence of approaches with a smug satisfaction.

 

 

July 8, 2009

Regulation of banks, building societies and insurers now looks to be a significant political battleground

The initial reaction to the Chancellor's announcement of a relatively tame and limited package of reforms of financial regulation has to be that the most significant aspect is actually the Tories' response. The Shadow Chancellor, George Osborne, told the House of Commons that an incoming Conservative government would scrap the tripartite regulatory system - FSA, Bank of England, Treasury - and replace it with a system where all prudential supervision of major financial institutions goes to the Bank of England, including banks, building societies and insurers. This would leave the Financial Services Authority as a "powerful regulator to protect consumers". Mr Osborne specifically said that it would have a brief "to stamp out unfair practices like mis-sold payment protection insurance and excessive bank charges".
This opens up a huge gulf between Labour and Conservatives on financial regulation as the centrepiece of Mr Darling's proposal is a further development (I hesitate to call it strengthening, although he did) of the tripartite system. This would see the Financial Services Authority retaining the principal role as the prudential regulator as well as taking on new powers to regulate hedge funds and other derivative products - at that level it would be a stronger system. Financial stability would rest with a new Council for Financial Stability, the tripartite arrangement re-invented. It is hard to see how that would work any better than the previous incarnation which failed to prevent last autumn's crisis.
The only common ground between the two major parties is over their hostility to the European Union propsoals embodied in the Larosiere Report. Both see this as potentially damaging to the UK and the City of London in particular and favour a much less prescriptive model of global co-operation. There is an element of heads in the sand over this as the EU is making  a massive land grab on the regulatory front and may have its new institutions up an running before the dust has settled on the next General Election in the UK.
The big danger in this is that the political uncertainty will actually cripple the current system, with the FSA unable to restructure and recruit, the Bank not able to develop its role and the Treasury sitting on the sidelines with civil servants not keen to do too much work that will be wasted should there be a change of government.

July 14, 2009

Vince Cable's book The Storm is worth reading for a real insight into the causes and consequences of the financial crisis


The Storm: The World Economic Crisis and What it Means is a breathtaking tour of economic policy that amply demonstrates why Vince Cable has eclipsed all other politicians with his response to the financial and economic crises of the last two years.
He puts our current problems in an historical and political context that helps the reader understand how we came so close to financial meltdown during the autumn of 2008. His almost effortless grasp of economic theory and policy can almost dazzle the reader at times and there isn't a page in this book that doesn't impart a fresh insight into the issues. Perhaps his greatest achievement is to pack so much in and yet always keep it accessible to the interested layperson, even if you do occasionally find yourself having to re-read a couple of pages because you haven't quite kept up with his relentless analysis.
True to form, he doesn't offer any glib, easy conclusions but lays out the challenges intelligently with emphasis on global action to tackle systemic risk while ensuring we do not fall into the trap of narrow economic nationalism or don the straitjacket of state capitalism.

July 16, 2009

Banking reform: reports galore promised over the next couple of weeks but will they get us any further foward?

Those following the debate about reform of the regulation for the banking and financial services sector are promised a wheelbarrow load of reports over the next couple of weeks: plenty of summer holiday reading.
Today, we will see the report from Sir David Walker regarding the banking governance. This promises to attract alot of headlines and comment but, if the leaks about it are correct, offer very little of genuine substance. It will suggest better 'training' for directors, more 'powers' for non-executives in particular to challenge management decisions and more 'transparency' over pay and bonuses. This doesn't seem to amount to much to me. Indeed, it offers little more than a description of what we have at the moment.
Did the directors of Royal Bank of Scotland really lack experience and knowledge of banking and the other financial services sectors that formed the core of RBS's business? Just what training could have equipped them better? Did they really not understand that a board of directors can out-vote a strong chief executive if it has a mind to? David Walker's report is going to have to go alot further than that if it is really to impress anyone.
As to transparency over pay, I am not convinced this alone will be of much benefit. Has the huge media coverage of Goldman Sach's likely bonuses payments this year changed anything? It isn't transparency that is the issue, it is the far more complex relationship between risk and reward and the potentially distorting effect of excessive incentives that is the crux of of the issue. Dealing with that is not about transparency but about how far we want regulators to control remuneration.
Inevitably, the European Union seems to have grasped this latter point as it continues its huge assault on the regulatory scene. Its latest report links remuneration to the new capital structures it would like to impose on banks and financial institutions and these capital structures, in turn, are linked to the risk that the institutions are potentially exposed to. This seems much more likely to be the real battleground for the debate about remuneration and incentives than mere transparency.
Then we mustn't forget the Treasury Select Committee. This has been strangely quiet in recent weeks but is promising up to three new reports before the end of the month, one of them dealing with the outstanding issues from its major inquiry into the causes and consequences of the banking crisis, namely regulatory reform. The committee has taken a long run at producing this report, giving it the luxury of seeing what others here in Europe and the USA have proposed. It could have a major impact on the course of the debate.
The real danger - and this is a slightly cynical point of view - is that the contradictory approaches advocated by all these reports will lead to a reform paralysis which will be exploited by those who do not want any new rules, controls or restrictions imposed on what they do. That is simply not an option. Governments may have been able to prop up a collapsing banking system once but they cannot afford to do it twice so we must find a way of ensuring that it is never allowed to hurl itself towards the cliff-edge again.

July 24, 2009

Treasury Select Committee has its say on regulatory reform

The Treasury Select Committee is promising a blizzard of reports over the next week, including its much-awaited verdict on reform of the financial regulatory system next Friday (31 July). The first reports are out this morning and should have a major influence on the debate in the UK.
  • Banking Crisis: International Dimensions, Eleventth Report, to be published at 11.00am on Friday 24 July
  • Evaluating the Efficiency Programme, Thirteenth Report, to be published at 00.01am on Tuesday 28 July
  • Banking Crisis: regulation and supervision, Fourteenth Report, to be puublished at 00.01am on Friday 31 July
  • Mortgage arrears and access to mortgage finance, Fifteenth Report, to be published at 00.01am on Saturday 8 August
  • Banking Crisis: dealing with the failure of the UK banks: Government, UK Financial Investments Ltd and Financial Services Authority Responses to the Seventh Report from the Committee, to be published at 11.00am on Friday 24 July
  • Banking Crisis: reforming corporate governance and pay in the City: Government, UK Financial Investments Ltd and Financial Services Authority Responses to the Ninth Report from the Committee, to be published at 11.00am on Friday 24 July.
These reports have been an unusually long time in coming. Whether that means there have been some tough debates in the committee and some difficult compromises made we will know shortly. The chances are that the committee chair, John McFall, has got his way and they will be tough and straightforward in their conclusions. Obviously, key areas to look at are going to be the committee's views on the tripartite regime, the degree to which it thinks remuneration should be controlled, its attitude to capitalisation and Glass-Steagall like separation of investment and retail banking and the role of European and international institutions.

July 31, 2009

Treasury Select Committee plays a long game

The long-awaited report from the Treasury Select Committee on the future of financial regulation seems to have disappointed some people.  I think they need to look a little harder at what John McFall's committee is saying. Just because it doesn't offer its own blueprint for the future of regulation doesn't mean that it won't influence what emerges or that it has ducked the issues. It is playing a longer game.
There should be relief that it hasn't thrown yet another permutation of regulatory over-sight into the mix. As it points out, there are almost too many views on how to shift the various functions around, not just here in the UK but in the European Union and the United States as well. What the report says is, 'Hang on a minute. Do we actually know what we are going to be regulating and have we got a clear idea of where responsibility for strategic decisions and executive action lies?'. This is the crux of the problem about the regulatory debate at the moment. It has all the feel of a group of blind people running around with sticking plasters trying to find the right holes to stick them on. No-one - apart from some in the EU (and Vince Cable) - seems to be asking how we can stop the holes appearing in the first place.
Mr Cable's point is similar to the committee's. He doesn't believe there is much point in creating a debate about regulatory structures until we have decided on how we want the banking sector to be reconstituted when the nationalised banks are returned to the private sector. In particular, Vince Cable and John McFall both want the "too big to fail" question addressed.
The select committee is also lukewarm about the debate on capital structures. Mr McFall dismissed alot of the proposals for matching capital to risk as mere "tweaking" and said that we musn't rule out legislation to separate out the riskier functions, thereby raising the spectre of the UK adopting something along the lines of the old US Glass-Steagall Act introduced after the Great Crash in 1929 and repealed by the Clinton administration in 1999. This threat will not go down well with many bankers.

September 17, 2009

EU hedge fund debate is getting an injection of commonsense

The European Union's headlong rush to be seen to be tough on hedge funds - which many in Europe find an easy target to blame for the financial turmoil of the last couple of years - is being  slowed down. The debate on the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) has so far generated rather more heat than light with alot of misguided lobbying from the City of London, epitomised by Boris Johnson's high profile sortie to Brussels. What he, and many in the City, fail to understand is that the supporters of the directive as it currently stands just rub their hands with a ghoulish relish when people complain that it will damage London: that is precisely the point of it as far as many in France, Germany and elsewhere are concerned. They see hedge funds and their various high risk cousins as lying at the heart of the reckless risk culture that brought once famous financial institutions to their knees.
Fortunately, some wiser voices are being heard in this debate.
As expected the Swedish presidency of the EU is taking a rather more measured and co-ordinated approach to the complex issues arising out of the global financial crisis. The pre-G20 summit meeting of EU leaders is part of that more thoughtful approach. The Swedes have realised that crudely attacking London will damage the whole EU and that the AIFMD as it currently stands would effectively prevent any EU citizen, pension fund or investor getting access to a very wide range of offshore funds (and offshore is where they would go under these proposals). Consequently, last week the Swedes told members states that they would prepare a modified version of the directive for discussion at the EU meeting on 22 September, prior to the G20 summit two days later in Pittsburgh.
A similarly conciliatory view is being taken by the new chair of the important European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, Sharon Bowles, a UK Liberal Democrat. She criticised EU regulators for their "impatience and need to be seen to be doing something", adding that many of the issues that have caused problems in the past are already being addressed by national regulators such as the UK Financial Services Authority.
This does not mean that hedge fund managers can sit back and think nothing will change. There will be new rules, and it is unclear still whether these will be dictated by national regulators, Europe or through the sort of co-ordinated global action that is likely to emerge from the G20 summit. They are likely to be quite tough rules too. However, they will not now be framed in such a way as to "punish" London and New York.

September 28, 2009

At last the mutuality debate gets underway, starting with Northern Rock

As bankers' bonuses grab the headlines and the European Union and G20 battle it out over who is leading the way in reshaping financial regulation, the debate about when and how to return the nationalised banks to the private sector is at last getting underway.
This is going to present huge challenges and not a few opportunities. The biggest opportunity is to promote a reshaping of ownership and competition in the banking sector, the surest way of creating a future that looks significantly different from the immediate past. Introducing greater diversity of ownership and extending competition will do more to deliver the almost universally shared objective of not allowing a return to the market structures and conditions that drove the financial markets to the edge of collapse just a year ago than any amount of new regulation.
I wrote how a fresh look at mutuality as an option for de-nationalising the banks should be high on the agenda when the Treasury Select Committee commented positively on this option in its major report earlier this year. Now the concept has been given some intellectual credibility by the publication of report by Professor Jonathan Michie of Oxford University. He focusses on Northern Rock and calls for it to be mutualised rather than just returned to the private sector and has won immediate support from John McFall, chairman of the Treasury Select Committee.
These ideas deserve serious consideration. I was surprised that something along these lines didn't feature at the recent Liberal Democrat conference as it would have been an ideal way for them to start to differentiate themselves from the other parties, especially the Labour Party which they say they want to replace as the main party of the left. It may be that Labour will themselves be able to use such ideas to differentiate themselves from the Conservatives as the election approaches and this issue gets more pressing: mutuality has deep roots in Labour through its very long association with the co-operative movement.
For now, we should just be grateful to Professor Michie for developing the arguments about the role of mutual institutions in a re-shaped banking sector.

October 9, 2009

So many of the big issues for financial services were overlooked at the party conferences, although Cameron did remember at the last minute

I have watched, waited, searched and searched again for signs that our three main political parties are looking for answers to some of the key issues surrounding the future of the financial services sector. My wait appears to have been just about in vain.
Sure, there was lots of bluster about bankers' bonuses at the Labour and Liberal Democrat conferences but this barely amounted to more than cheap headline grabbing and beyond some pretty obvious proposals about linking bankers' remuneration to longer term performance, they barely scratched the surface of that debate.
I had expected the main parties to stake out some distinctive territory on at least two of the key issues that loom large as a result of the financial crises of the last two years and last autumn's cataclysmic events in particular.
The first is the failure of elaborate systems of regulation to predict, prevent or adequately respond to the crises. There is a fierce debate raging around the world about how we can regulate the financial services sector better. It has been on the agenda at the last two G20 Summits world leaders consider it that important. Yet, it seemed to find no place on the agendas of the party conferences at least, that is, until it belatedly got a mention in David Cameron's speech to the Conservative Party conference yesterday. He slipped in a brief mention of the Tories' plans to transfer the main regulatory burden to the Bank of England, condemning Labour's no change stance on the way. We are still in the dark over exactly how the Financial Services Authority will be split up between the Bank of England and the proposed Consumer Protection Agency  but at least we know it is still on their agenda.
The other issue the next government will not be able to duck is what to do with the state owned financial institutions, yet no-one seemed prepared to address this. Part of the public anger over bankers' bonuses is the lack of understanding of the difference between ownership and control. The government has tried to separate the two, taking ownership but choosing not to exercise control: the public believes control follows ownership as night follows day.
This is an area where there is an opportunity for creative policymaking, not least when you consider how to tackle the challenge of returning some of these state owned assets to the private sector - which the next government will have to start doing at sometime. Just consider some of the options: the state could take control and use that to create new forms of socially useful financial products (if you follow Lord Turner's analysis), it could break them up to set the banking sector on a path away from the "too big to fail" destination we seem to have reached in the last decade, it could insist on new forms of ownership (based on mutuality) as they are de-nationalised or it could go for high profile privatisations just designed to pour money back into the public purse. You can see quickly the potential for staking out distinctive political territory with policies of real substance.
It will be impossible for the parties to continue to ignore these issues as we go into 2010 and they start drawing up their election manifestoes. It seems a shame that they all missed the opportunity to start a genuine debate during the party conference season.

January 22, 2010

Obama bank plan puts UK on the defensive and EU in the shade

Barak Obama has clearly run out of patience, not just with Wall Street but with other governments and financial regulators around the world. His shock announcement yesterday of a a radical new regulatory regime for the banking sector has obviously been brewing for a long time and, one imagines, has been discussed, at least in principle, with other governments in the G20.
The loss of a vital Senate seat to the Republicans in Massachusetts earlier this week galvanised President Obama into action. You can't help wondering if he had made this announcement on Monday whether the Democrats would have held on to the Massachusetts seat such has been the favourable reception of this plan on what the Americans refer to as Main Street.
The banks loved the idea that the G20 countries would only move on major regulatory reform by agreement because they knew that such agreement would be very hard to come by. President Obama has now made it clear that he is not prepared to wait for ever for such agreement to emerge - with the threat that it would be a watered down compromise when it did. Also, he needed to act after the Senate setback was followed up by Goldman Sachs' bullish bonus announcement. Flaunting their bonus billions in the face of Main Street was a pretty inept move.
I don't want to dwell on the detail of the plan devised by Paul Volckler or look at its impact on the sector but, instead, consider some of the broader political implications.
As I have already said, the coverage from the US today suggests that it will go down well and should do alot to boost the President's approval ratings. Whether that, in turn, helps him with his healthcare reforms remains to be seen but I would expect to see him closely associated with these proposals as they work their way through Congress.
In the UK, it has made the Labour government look even weaker. The attempts of the City minister Lord Myners today to suggest that the US plans are just a different way of achieving what the UK government has set out to do look very flimsy. They clearly go way, way beyond what the UK government has proposed and will lead to many people asking why the UK can't be as tough. Already, after a little wobble this morning, the Tories have lined up behind the principle, but not necessarily the detail, of the US plans and the Liberal Democrats, who will hold the crucial balance in a hung Parliament, have given them a ringing endorsement. Both opposition parties are strongly in favour of a split between investment and retail banking as a pre-requisite of major reforms.
Looking into the European Union, this will make some of the proposals it has been contemplating so far look a little timid and that will not be what the new Commission wants, especially Michel Barnier, the new French commissioner in charge of the internal market and financial services. He has come in amid a blaze of threats about punishing those who contributed so much to the current economic woes of the world. I can't imagine he will be too happy at the Americans looking and acting tougher than the EU so expect so action when the new Commission begins work in earnest in the middle of next month.
In short, President Obama has probably unleashed a wave of even tougher regulatory reform around the world by leading from the front rather than waiting for a limited consensus.

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